California Accident Attorneys Blog
Factual and Procedural Background
Kathy Ryan was preparing to turn left into a grocery store parking lot after traveling north on Highland Springs Avenue in Beaumont on Aug. 10, 2018, at 4 pm. The southbound roadway had three lanes she needed to cross, and the area did not have any traffic lights. The drivers in the two lanes nearest to her yielded and motioned for her to turn. She stated she didn’t see any vehicles in the third lane and turned left across all three lanes to enter the parking lot.
Trisha Drury was driving southbound in the third lane and was preparing to enter the on-ramp to the freeway from Highland Springs Avenue when Ryan’s vehicle crossed her pathway. Drury was unable to stop and collided with the rear of Ryan’s car. Drury did apply the brakes and swerved to the right to avoid the crash, but she couldn’t.
While Drury’s vehicle was drivable, and she was able to take it to her home, she subsequently developed chronic severe pain and limited mobility in her neck and left arm. She filed a negligence lawsuit against Ryan on July 12, 2019, and Ryan filed an answer on Aug. 19, 2019.
The parties couldn’t reach a settlement agreement, so the case went to trial before a jury scheduled for the first 10 days of November 2022. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Ryan, finding she hadn’t been negligent. The judge entered the judgment on Nov. 30, 2022, and Drury filed an intent to move for a new trial on Jan. 4, 2023.
One of the things she argued was that the trial court judge erred by failing to give the jury a negligence per se instruction under CACI No. 418 based on Ryan’s violation of Cal. Veh. Code § 21801 by making an improper left-hand turn in front of oncoming vehicles. The trial court judge denied her motion for a new trial, so Drury filed an appeal.
Issue: Whether the Court Committed a Prejudicial, Reversible Error by Failing to Give a Negligence Per Se Instruction?
On appeal, Drury raised several issues. The first one was that the court’s failure to give the jury a negligence per se instruction was a reversible error because the outcome of the case would likely have been different if the judge had given the jury that instruction. She also argued the following three other grounds for appeal:
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- The jury’s finding that Ryan was not negligent was unsupported by the evidence.
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- The defense counsel made improper appeals to the jury’s emotions during his closing argument.
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- One jury member engaged in misconduct by asserting her personal opinion about the intersection based on her personal experience with it.
The Court of Appeal didn’t take up these three issues and solely focused on the trial court’s failure to give the requested negligence per se instruction.
Rule: Negligence is presumed when a person violates a statute and subsequently causes another person’s injury because of that violation.
Under Cal. Evid. Code § 669(a), negligence is presumed when a person violates a statute, ordinance, or regulation and causes another person’s injury when the law was meant to prevent the type of injury the victim sustained. Drury argued that Ryan violated Cal. Veh. Code § 21801 by making an improper left-hand turn across a roadway, so the jury should have been given the jury instruction about presuming she was negligent per se. She argued that the judge’s refusal to properly instruct the jury amounted to reversible error because the jury would otherwise have had to find that Ryan was negligent under the facts of the case and Ryan’s traffic violation.
Analysis
When an issue on appeal is regarding a judge’s instructional error, the Court of Appeal doesn’t give deference to the trial court’s decision. Instead, the Court of Appeal must consider the evidence in the most favorable light to the claim that an instructional error occurred. In civil cases, a judge’s instructional error is not reversible unless it was prejudicial and affected the verdict. To determine whether an instructional error was prejudicial, the court considers the following factors:
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- The evidence’s quality
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- Other instructions given and their effect
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- The attorneys’ arguments and their effect
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- Any indications given by the jury that they were misled
After noting these factors, the court turned to the judge’s failure to give the negligence per se instruction. Drury requested the judge to give the jury CACI No. 418, which is the negligence per se instruction. However, Ryan objected to it and asked the court only give the reasonable person instruction and the negligence instruction. The court sustained Ryan’s objection and found that the general negligence instruction included language that was sufficient when combined with the language contained in CVC 21801. On appeal, Ryan also argued that the court’s failure to give the negligence per se instruction did not prejudice Drury in any way.
The Court of Appeal said that refusing to give a more specific instruction and instead only giving a general instruction that depends on the jury’s ability to understand the rule through abstract thought is not sufficient. The Court of Appeal then compared Drury’s case to a case with a similar fact pattern.
In Sesler v. Guhmman, 219 Cal.App.3d 218 (1990), the defendant tried to make an unprotected left-hand turn across three lanes of traffic just like in Drury’s case. Drivers in the first two lanes allegedly motioned him across, but he hit a car traveling in the third lane. At the trial, the judge instructed the jury on CVC 21801, the left-hand turn statute, but refused to give a specific instruction to the jury about negligence per se that was modeled on the ruling in a third case. In that case, the Court of Appeal found the judge’s refusal to give this instruction amounted to prejudicial error because it accurately stated the law regarding the presumption of negligence when a statutory violation occurs that results in the type of accident the statute is meant to prevent.
Drury argued that CACI No. 418 should have been given to the jury because there was substantial evidence that Ryan had violated the left-hand turn law, resulting in the type of accident the statute was designed to prevent. The evidence showed that Ryan did not stop at any point after starting her turn, but she should have stopped at the second lane to check the third before attempting to cross it.
While Ryan claimed she was only driving 9 mph at the time of the accident, Ryan’s reconstruction expert testified she was traveling at 20 mph. The Court of Appeal noted that it wouldn’t have been possible for her to reach a speed of 20 mph in the third lane if she had stopped to check for traffic in front of the stopped vehicles in the second lane. Because of her failure to stop to look for traffic, the Court of Appeal found Ryan violated CVC 21801, and the negligence per se instruction should thus have been given to the jury by the trial court.
However, Ryan argued that CVC 21801 includes a reasonable person standard in its statutory language and that a separate negligence per se instruction was unnecessary. To support her argument, she relied on a different case involving a bicyclist cycling on a sidewalk who was struck by a car exiting a parking lot. However, the court in that case refused to give the negligence per se instruction requested by the cyclist because it was unclear from the evidence whether the vehicle driver had violated any traffic law. The driver’s view was obstructed by a bush lining the sidewalk, and the driver was unable to see the cyclist. The driver had stopped to watch for traffic, which distinguished that case from Ryan’s actions since Ryan never stopped.
The court then considered whether the instructional error misled the jury and was thus reversible. An error is considered prejudicial when not making it would likely have led to a different trial outcome. The court noted that the defense attorney’s arguments during his closing likely misled the jury by forcing them to focus only on the reasonable person standard rather than on Ryan’s per se violation of the statute. Because of this, the court found the error was reversible.
Conclusion
The court granted Drury’s appeal and reversed the lower court’s decision. The case was remanded to the court for a new trial, and Drury was awarded her costs on the appeal.
Consult an Experienced Personal Injury Attorney
If you were involved in a left-hand turn accident caused by a driver who failed to yield to you when they were turning left, you might be entitled to compensation. Talk to an experienced personal injury attorney about your case for free by calling the law firm of Steven M. Sweat, Personal Injury Lawyers, APC at (866) 966-5240.