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Defendant Not Liable for Tree on Their Property Causing Accident

In some car accidents in California, third parties might be partially at fault for failing to maintain property in a reasonably safe condition to prevent foreseeable injuries. In Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Superior Court, Cal. Ct. App. Case No. F087132, the California Court of Appeal considered whether Union Pacific Railroad could be held negligent for its failure to remove a tree that was located within the clear zone next to a highway that was involved in a fatal wreck.

Factual and Procedural Background

Robert and Elise Sandford were driving a motorhome north on State Route 99 near Madera, California on May 25, 2016, when they struck a Freightliner truck driving north on the highway driven by Deon Detes Abrams, Sr. The collision caused both vehicles to leave the road and hit a tree on adjacent property owned by Union Pacific Railroad Co. The vehicles burst into flames, and all of the occupants of both died.

The tree was located on a narrow, 100-foot strip of land that included the tracks and a 50-foot right-of-way on either side of them. The tree was located just under 21 feet away from the nearest lane of travel and 43 feet from the center of the tracks. It had been growing undisturbed for 74 years and had been there in 1949 in a photograph that depicted the four-lane highway as its original two-lane trafficway. The railroad company inspected the land and its tracks regularly and testified it did so up to 100 times per year.

The relatives of the two families filed lawsuits against Union Pacific Railroad Co., which were consolidated on appeal. The plaintiffs contended that the rail company was negligent in failing to remove the tree.

Union Pacific Railroad filed a motion for summary judgment and stated it had never received communication from the California Department of Transportation (Caltrans) telling it to remove the tree or any notice of safety concerns or incidents about the tree in all that time. Union Pacific argued the plaintiffs could not show that the company owed a duty of care to the decedents to remove the tree.

In opposition, the plaintiffs argued that a 2012 manual from Caltrans stated that having a 30-foot width between a highway and objects allowed 80% of vehicles that leave the road to recover and called for a recovery zone of a minimum of 30 feet. In a 2010 preliminary investigation, the Department called for at least a 30-foot recovery zone free from trees and other obstructions but stated that 40 would be preferred. Its 2018 Highway Design Manual required Caltrans to establish a minimum 30-foot clearance zone from the edge of highways and large trees with trunks larger than 4 inches in diameter. The tree the parties struck had a diameter of 8 feet.

The plaintiffs also noted that several national organizations also called for a minimum clearance zone of 30 feet next to the edges of highways consisting of flat, cleared land and that trees are the most common obstruction struck by vehicles, resulting in 48% of deaths from striking fixed objects. They argued that Union Pacific had known about the tree for decades but failed to remove it.

The trial court issued a tentative order denying Union Pacific’s summary judgment motion on Sept. 28, 2023. It subsequently issued an Oct. 9, 2023, order adopting the tentative order. The railroad company filed a petition for a writ of mandamus to seek appellate review of the trial court’s order denying the motion for summary judgment, and the plaintiffs filed a reply.

Issue: Whether Union Pacific Railroad had a duty of care to remove the tree since it was within 30 feet of the edge of the highway?

At issue on appeal was whether Union Pacific owed a duty of care to remove the tree due to its location within 30 feet of the highway’s edge. It argued it didn’t, and the plaintiffs couldn’t establish the duty of care. It argued that since the plaintiffs couldn’t establish duty, summary judgment was appropriate. The plaintiffs argued that the duty of care was established by Cal. Civ. Proc. § 1714, which states that all people have a duty of ordinary care to prevent injuries to others by properly maintaining their properties. The issue was whether this section applied and if it did, whether it was enough to establish Union Pacific’s duty of care.

Rule: Parties are responsible for injuries caused to others because of their lack of ordinary care in maintaining their property.

Under Cal. Civ. Proc. § 1714, all people must exercise ordinary care in how they conduct themselves and maintain their property to prevent foreseeable injuries to others.

Analysis

The Court of Appeal began by analyzing § 1714. It noted that the statute provides an exception for situations in which the injured party brought the injury upon themselves by their own reckless or negligent acts. The plaintiffs argued that the California Supreme Court abolished its distinction between artificial and natural obstructions in Sprecher v. Adamson Companies, 30 Cal.3d 358 (1981) and found that a party’s duty is determined in terms of principles of ordinary negligence.

The court then looked at the scope of Union Pacific’s duty of care as asserted by the plaintiffs to determine whether it existed. Union Pacific had acknowledged that § 1714 applied, so the court analyzed negligence and the duty of care as it applied to the case.

To establish a defendant’s negligence, the plaintiffs must prove each of the elements, including duty, breach, causation, and damages. It noted that the duty of a property owner is not absolute and does not require them to exercise extraordinary care. The Court of Appeal then applied the factors under Rowland v. Christian, 63 Cal. Rptr. 98 (1967), a seminal case in which the California Supreme Court established specific factors courts should consider when deciding whether to create a judicial exception. It noted that an exception should not be created unless it clearly is supported by public policy. Rowland contains both foreseeability and public policy factors.

When considering the foreseeability factors, the court noted the harm must be reasonably foreseeable and not speculative. Union Pacific argued that the clear zone still provided more than 20 feet of clearance between the tree and the highway and argued that Caltrans believed 20 feet was acceptable if not preferred. It noted that the section of the highway was straight and relatively obstruction-free and that no previous incidents involving the tree had been reported.

The plaintiffs cited another case involving a truck driver who parked 16 feet away from a sign that said the area was for emergency parking only to eat a sandwich when someone else veered off the highway and struck his truck. After a jury found the truck driver partially at fault, the trucking company appealed. While the Court of Appeal reversed the jury’s verdict, the California Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeal and affirmed the jury’s decision. The plaintiffs argued that the case was similar to the one in the instant case.

However, the Court of Appeal noted some important dissimilarities. In that case, the truck driver was on notice that the area was only for emergency parking since a sign had been posted. In this case, Union Pacific had never received a complaint or safety incident report concerning the tree’s location. It also noted that Caltrans is responsible for designing highways and for notifying landowners to remove nearby obstructions that could pose a safety hazard but never communicated an issue about the tree to Union Pacific. It found this factor didn’t support creating an exception, and it also found the second foreseeability factor didn’t support or go against an exception.

The third foreseeability factor, which was the connection between Union Pacific’s conduct and the injuries suffered by the decedents, also includes a consideration of the conduct of third parties beyond the defendant. When intervening events cause a party’s injury because of their actions, their own negligence is independent of the landowner’s negligence unless the tree impairs their vision.

The court stated there was no evidence the tree’s presence increased the likelihood of accidents on SR 99 or that Union Pacific did anything to cause the drivers to engage in negligent driving behaviors. However, it noted that the tree’s presence was causally linked to the decedents’ deaths and found the third foreseeability factor did not support creating a judicial exception.

The court noted that the public policy factors must also be considered even when the foreseeability factors weigh in favor of finding a duty of care. Union Pacific argued it had nothing to do with the highway’s design and thus had no moral blame for the incident. The court noted that Union Pacific did nothing to create the hazard or cause the collision and had no more notice of the tree’s dangerous condition than the notice that passing motorists had since it had never been contacted about the tree previously. The court noted that recognizing a duty would cause an inverse condemnation of the land and thus would be against public policy. Finally, the court found that public policy outweighed the foreseeability factors and weighed in favor of creating a judicial exception to the duty of care under the case’s facts.

Conclusion

The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s order denying Union Pacific’s motion for summary judgment. It ordered the trial court to enter a new order granting the motion, which meant the plaintiff’s case was over.

Consult an Experienced Los Angeles Injury Attorney

If you were seriously injured or lost a loved one in a car crash you believe also involved potential third-party liability, consult an experienced Los Angeles injury attorney at the law firm of Steven M. Sweat, Personal Injury Lawyers, APC. We can review the evidence and reports and explain the merits of your claim. Call us for a free consultation at 866.966.5240.

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